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Abstract 
From its earliest years, the development of the Internet was grounded in economic relations, 
be it with the government or private investors. This condition spilled over into the Web 
development and all of its corresponding features, including the people populating the Web – 
thus making an impact on a new form of community: a virtual one. The economic relations of 
the real world affect the creation of new forms of labor, referred to as immaterial labor, which 
is produced by a new type of worker. This new type of worker is endemic to the new 
conditions of labor most visible in instances of human interaction, participation, cooperation 
and collaboration in virtual communities, best examples being the social networking sites. 
The collaborating subject, i.e. the producer is at the same time both a consumer and a 
producer of the products of the social production happening in the virtual world. It is referred 
to as a prosumer. The concept of a prosumer is closely linked to the new forms of economic 
gains for the individual users. The gains need not be monetary, they also include 
psychological satisfaction for the individual. This psychological effect of participating in 
virtual communities is termed affective gain, or affective reward. In addition, the Web users’ 
participation in online communities is one of the main sources of profit for the large 
companies online owning the said social networking sites. However, there are certain aspects 
of collaboration online that are not susceptible to profit extraction. They include, among other 
things, the open source culture online. Open source movement allows the individual to be 
excluded from larger monetary exchanges and capitalist relations operating online. It pits 
users’ collaboration – seen as one of the main sources of profit – against market relations 
online. All these various aspects of our virtual lives are explored in detail.  
Key words: the Internet, the Web, virtual community, neoliberalism, social production, 
collaboration, prosumer, immaterial labor, affective reward, open source 
 
1. Introduction 
The Web experience is both cultural and economic at once. The purpose of this thesis is to 
show how the Web has over time become a market in itself where cultural activities started to 
be exchanged for their monetary value. The thesis deals with the ways in which the collective 
activity of the Web users gets exploited for profit by capitalist entities online. The Web users, 
therefore, become caught in the crossroads between their cultural activities and economic 
relations. In other words, the collective performance of the Web users reflects both cultural 
and economic ideologies relating to the emergence of the Internet and the Web.  
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Along with the emergence of the Internet and the Web, corresponding cultural 
ideologies have been engendered in them. These ideologies reflect various – most often 
utopian – ideas of what changes the new information technologies will bring for the 
individual users, ranging from the ideas of individual freedom – most distinctive for the US 
cultural legacy which places a rather significant emphasis on individual freedom, coupled 
with the notions of self-sufficiency and self-reliance – to the ideas that the Internet can bring 
about changes on a larger social scale, such as creating a more democratic society.  
These ideologies are, as mentioned, more often than not, mostly utopian, and they do 
not reflect the actual conditions of the Web experience. From the early years of the Internet 
development, these ideologies have been in conflict with the realities of the Web experience 
which entail various forms of discrimination of its users, attempts of control and 
centralization of the Web, and even obstacles in accessing the Web. On the other hand, the 
cultural ideologies become intertwined with the economic element on the Web which seeks to 
commodify the Web users’ collective activities. These activities are turned into a form of 
labor performed by users via the interference of capital interests looking to make profit from 
the users, which then become not only users, but workers on the Web.  
The type of labor produced by these workers is referred to as immaterial labor and it 
produces, according to Hardt and Negri, “relationships, communication, and knowledge,” 
which then become goods “appropriated by capital for economic needs” (qtd. in Fuchs 188). 
In this way, the Web users become workers whose labor is monetized by different capitalist 
forces online, and they themselves become not only workers, i.e. producers of immaterial 
labor, but also consumers of the same labor. They become a new economic entity – the 
prosumer.  
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The prosumers are a significant element of late capitalism, or post-Fordism, in which 
the working conditions of production are more flexible and more precarious, due to the fact 
that in post-industrial capitalism, the material infrastructure is no longer a classic factory 
which provides a fixed time and place of employment, but rather includes areas of production 
such as the Internet, and as part of the virtual communities. The existence of virtual 
communities is most obvious in social networking sites, which are then the new infrastructure 
where cultural production and immaterial labor can take place. Terranova argues that “[t]he 
outcome of the explicit interface between capital and the Internet is a digital economy that 
manifests all the signs of an acceleration of the capitalist logic of production” (47).  
In other words, the economic logic of late capitalism has migrated online; and the Web 
has become an extension and continuation of the market relations previously contained in the 
non-virtual, physical world. Terranova claims that “the Internet is animated by cultural and 
technical labor through and through, a continuous production of value that is completely 
immanent to the flows of the network society at large” (34). Not only the economic relations, 
but the cultural, and some larger social aspects of human interaction have also migrated 
online. 
However, it is important to note that while online activities are perceived as labor and 
commodity to be sold, they are not necessarily seen as such by the users themselves. The 
labor the Web users perform can be said to be balancing between work and leisure for the 
individuals. That is, the reason the system of exploitation online actually works is because the 
laborers, i.e. the prosumers, do not perceive it as such, but rather, they receive affective 
reward, or affective gain, which Petersen refers to as “the immense joy and pleasure [users] 
get out of sharing (…) online” (“Loser Generated Content”).  
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 Additionally, the Internet and virtual communities show that not every aspect of social 
interaction must necessarily be monetized. This is most observable in the open source 
movement, which is an example of voluntary work online, and which does not necessarily get 
extracted for profit by large profit-seeking companies online. It is, as elaborated by 
Terranova, “a model of software development in which the underlying code of a program – 
the source code, a.k.a. the crown jewels – is by definition made freely available to the general 
public for modification, alteration, and endless redistribution” (49).  
Therefore, in order to demonstrate all the aspects of how the system of cultural 
interaction and the creation of virtual communities work, along with the capitalist exploitation 
of them, I start with the description of the Internet and the Web’s historical development, 
from their early renditions in mid-20th century to their contemporary versions in the 21st 
century. From there on I intend to show the collision of the realities of the Web experience 
with the utopian visions and ideologies that came into life with the first computers and 
networks connecting them. A great deal of these utopian ideologies are, for the purpose of this 
thesis, taken from the writings of the creator of the World Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee.  
The main part of the thesis contains detailed accounts of the emergence of virtual 
communities, the emergence of the concept of prosumers and the labor they perform in the 
social production online, and finally, of how that social production is exploited for profit by 
large companies operating primarily online. The thesis ends on a more optimistic note, with 
the description of the open source movement as an instance which demonstrates the 
possibilities of liberation for the individual from both the elements of control online and 
processes of exploitation.  
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2. History of the Internet and Web Development 
Before the emergence of the Web, an infrastructure for its feasible existence had to be 
set in place. The Internet provided such infrastructure inasmuch as it allowed computers to be 
linked together and communicate. Before the Internet, Berners-Lee notes, computers were 
linked by cables and the only way for them to communicate was through software programs 
that had to be installed on each of the connected computers. These software programs would 
then communicate with other software programs installed on other computers. The process 
was very impractical since it would allow only a limited number of computers to 
communicate simultaneously. It would take hundreds of cables for a computer to be able to 
communicate with others in proportions and quantities we are familiar with and accustomed 
to today. The Internet was, in this sense, a revolutionary invention which offered a network 
for simultaneous communication between an unlimited number of computers without having 
to use cables as the only means of connection (Weaving the Web 19-20).  
 Berners-Lee states that 
[t]he Internet is a network of networks. Its essence, though, is a set of standardized 
protocols – conventions by which computers send data to each other. The data are 
transmitted over various carriers, such as telephone lines, cable TV wires, and satellite 
channels. (…) When a computer is ready to send its data, it uses special software to 
break the data into packets that will conform to two Internet protocols that govern how 
the packets will be shipped: IP (Internet Protocol) and TCP (Transmission Control 
Protocol).  (…) [The software] sends the packets out over the phone or cable wire, and 
the receiving computer uses its own Internet software to put them back together. 
(Weaving the Web 20) 
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This action, made possible by the 1970s, could be executed only by computer experts working 
with the said software. However, the arrival of the electronic mail alleviated much of the 
problem associated with sending and receiving packets of data. In the 1980s, according to 
Cortada, IT experts in Armonk, New York decided that e-mail should become the standard 
means of business communication among different sales offices. This practice held on and 
“the result was that in more than 150 countries, business e-mail became ubiquitous” (15). 
These processes of sending data via computers were, of course, preceded by the development 
of the Internet, which took place in the US.  
 With the threat of WWII in the US, the Department of Defense started funding the 
development of electronic technologies, mostly focusing on military computer projects and 
applications. In the words of Cortada, these computer projects were used “to decipher enemy 
encrypted communications, to prepare artillery and bombing firing tables, and later to perform 
the calculations for designing atomic weapons” (7). Soon afterwards, in the early 1950s,  
[t]he Cold War and the Korean War motivated federal officials to support further 
technical developments in what clearly was still an expensive, complex and unstable 
technology. They relied largely on academic institutions (such as Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology) and the private sector (such as IBM, NCR, and General 
Electric [GE]) to do the actual work. By the mid-1950s, companies like Univac and 
IBM were transforming their government-supported machines into commercial 
products. (Cortada 7) 
In other words, the development of computers and networks for their communications 
was primarily motivated by the American fear of foreign enemies. Streeter claims that “the 
internet was to a large degree created by people within or funded by the U.S. Department of 
Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA, with a D for Defense for a time 
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added to make it DARPA), a Cold War institution created in the 1950s specifically to counter 
the Soviet Union’s perceived technological superiority in the wake of Sputnik” (23). The 
funding of such projects was left to the US government primarily because no other entity 
could justify it, let alone finance it. In the words of Streeter, who paraphrases an MIT 
scientist, Vannevar Bush, 
[p]rivate enterprise (…) would be unable to take on the risks of basic exploration 
because it was too uncertain to justify investment. Government and nonprofit 
institutions like universities and the military, therefore, should conduct the initial, 
high-risk exploratory research and then turn the results over to industry to develop 
commercially exploitable applications; government-sponsored research yields 
practical benefits that can eventually be exploited by the business world. (24) 
Therefore, at first, the Internet served as a means of countering the enemies’ technological 
developments, and as such was funded solely by the US government, helped by the US 
military and various academic institutions. Nevertheless, from its early days it was envisioned 
as a possible investment for private companies which were to develop it further.  
The American business environment proved to be an especially fertile ground for 
private investors to further the development of information technologies, even as early as the 
1950s. Cortada argues that the US owes its leading role in information technologies to several 
factors: the American market which had already been using information technologies (such as 
tabulating equipment), large investment firms and the influx of federal funds (7). The 
technologies were most rapidly being developed in the US for these reasons. Cortada 
continues by saying that “US entrepreneurs were often some of the earliest to exploit the 
situation. This is the story of Silicon Valley and 
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Apple, of PC software providers such as Microsoft, and later of firms that leveraged the 
Internet, for instance, eBay and Amazon.com” (7).  
 In addition to this commercial element of the Internet, what marked its development 
from the beginning was, in the words of Streeter, “an unusual culture of informal, open, 
horizontal cooperation” (95). The Internet was not developed by a number of designated 
authors or scientists, or by a couple of information technology enthusiasts working in their 
garage, but rather by a cohort of skilled IT aficionados working independently of each other, 
and later collaborating on projects of similar interests. In other words, the early days of the 
Internet development were marked by a non-hierarchical, decentralized system of 
cooperation. Such working conditions for the early developers of the Internet offered a 
glimpse into a prospective future of a utopian decentralized world in which this network of 
networks provides a form of escape from the daily constraints of work and everyday life. This 
utopian vision was only one among many ideas which accompanied the history of both 
Internet and Web development, all of which will be elaborated in subsequent chapters.  
The Internet having arrived, what remained problematic was getting people to openly 
put and exchange data through this network of networks. In essence, there was no place where 
certain bits of information could be stored. Data could only be sent to another computer, but 
could not be accessed or viewed by a third party – the one excluded from the exchange. The 
Web changed all this, and it all started with e-mail. Berners-Lee notes that “[e]-mail allowed 
messages to be sent from one person to another, but it did not form a space in which 
information could permanently exist and be referred to. Messages were transient. When the 
World Wide Web arrived, riding on top of the Internet, it would give information a place to 
persist” (Weaving the Web 18). In other words, the Web was seen as a layer on top of another 
layer – the Internet. In the words of Berners-Lee,  
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[t]he Web is an application that runs on the Internet, which is an electronic network 
that transmits packets of information among millions of computers according to a few 
open protocols. An analogy is that the Web is like a household appliance that runs on 
the electricity network. A refrigerator or printer can function as long as it uses a few 
standard protocols – in the U.S, things like operating at 120 volts and 60 hertz. 
Similarly, any application – among them the Web, e-mail or instant messaging – can 
run on the Internet as long as it uses a few standard Internet protocols, such as TCP 
and IP. (“Long Live the Web” 83) 
 
2.1. Net as an American Invention 
The invention of the Web, and the Net before that, gave rise to the corresponding 
“place” they occupied – the cyberspace1. Since the Internet was from the beginning funded by 
the US government, it was perceived as an American invention in the collective 
consciousness of the Internet users. Even the Web creator, Tim Berners-Lee, having finished 
his work at CERN, and realizing that the Web was here to stay and be further developed by 
the rest of the IT community, stipulated that “[he] knew [he] had to move to the center of 
gravity of the Internet, which was the United States” (Weaving the Web 89). This was taking 
place in the 1980s when, according to Streeter, the Internet became commercialized (107). 
However, only in the 1990s did the Internet frenzy really take off, due to the creation of the 
first “freely distributed computer program called Mosaic, the first successful graphical Web 
browser” (Streeter 126).  
                                                     
1
 The coining of the word cyberspace is usually attributed to William Gibson who refers to it as the place ”where 
the bank keeps your money. It’s where a long-distance telephone call happens. It’s this ubiquitous, non-physical 
place where increasingly a lot of what we think of as our civilization takes place” (qtd. in Hanson 348). 
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 The 1980s were a time when the Internet became a business. Politically and 
economically, the US society and politics were governed by the neoliberal doctrine with the 
president Ronald Reagan as its US spokesman.  
The late twentieth century economy represents a shift from the economic paradigm of 
an earlier economic era in which human labor was characterized by factory-like features; i.e. 
the value of the product of labor was equated with time spent producing a product, in a 
classical Marxist definition of labor theory of value. The economic form that exploits this 
exchange, in which surplus value is extracted by pricing the end product higher than the 
investments costs, is referred to as capitalism. Fuchs claims that, “[f]or Marx, capitalism is 
based on the permanent theft of unpaid labor from workers by capitalists” (184). Some 
economists refer to this type of economic form of production as Fordism. The late twentieth 
century witnessed a shift from this economy which was, as noted by Hardt and Negri, 
characterized by the stable long-term employment typical of factory workers to one 
marked by flexible, mobile, and precarious labor relations: flexible because workers 
have to adapt to different tasks, mobile because workers have to move more frequently 
between jobs, and precarious because no contracts guarantee stable, long-term 
employment. (112) 
Authors elaborate on these new economic relations in which labor value of the worker is 
extracted in late capitalism, and which are characterized by the absence of factories and the 
intrusion of new information and communication technologies.  
The new technologies of the late twentieth century help capitalists exploit the 
workers/individuals using these new realms of employment, increasingly focusing on people’s 
online activities as sources of profit. In other words, the factory has migrated online. 
However, the problem is that these activities no longer provide factory-like conditions such as 
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a clear division between work and leisure time, and fixed time and place of employment. The 
labor performed by these online activities some authors term immaterial or knowledge labor, 
the issue of which will be further explored in later chapters. 
 In addition, the concept of immaterial labor can only survive in an economy heavily 
dependent upon immaterial working conditions2, such as the one provided by the Internet. 
Some authors, such as Harvey, term the period neoliberalism, which can be interpreted as “a 
potential antidote to threats to the capitalist social order and as a solution to capitalism’s ills” 
(Harvey 19). These ills refer to the unemployment and inflation that started to plague the US 
economy in late 1960s. The central tenet of neoliberal doctrine is “[t]he assumption that 
individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the market and of trade” (Harvey 7). 
In such an economic context, the US government was no longer the main sponsor of 
Web development; rather, the role was predominantly taken on by private investors. This 
overall atmosphere in the US was more than welcoming of the individual entrepreneur willing 
to invest in the new economy, as seen in the words of Reagan: “We have lived through the 
age of big industry and the age of the giant corporation. But I believe that this is the age of the 
entrepreneur” (qtd. in Streeter 69). These words resonate with “the governing ideas of 
American society in the early 1980s, when a radical belief in markets and an accompanying 
suspicion of all forms of government regulation (…) would become common sense among 
many in positions of power” (Streeter 70). Therefore, cyberspace and the Web seemed to have 
epitomized the dominant ideology of Western thought at the time, with its headquarters in the 
US. In the words of Manjikian,  
                                                     
2
 The virtual world of the Internet and of immaterial labor are only virtual and immaterial on the surface. 
Physical infrastructure is still needed for the system to work. Not only is the physical element such as cables and 
optic fibers necessary for the individuals to become connected online, the physical human labor is required as 
well. As elaborated by Downey, “[t]he new virtual economy cannot escape a very old physical fact: it takes 
human labor to make the Web work” (210). He continues by saying that “electronic spaces depend on 
underground fiber optic cables, rooftop microwave transceivers, and suburban offices where network 
administrators keep backup power supplies on call” (218).  
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cyberspace was (…) a field for the overlay of traditional power structures into this new 
surface. (…) [W]hile cyberspace might be without a nationality or a gender, it was not 
without and economic ideology. Cyberspace was capitalist, not socialist, not based on 
barter or some other system – and, by extension, it may be argued, cyberspace also 
was construed of as 'western,' perhaps even American. (385) 
Put differently, at the time the US was the most developed capitalist system in the 
world. The Internet was created in the US. Manjikian draws a logical conclusion when she 
claims that cyberspace and the Internet almost seem to have lost all other options other than 
becoming capitalist as well (385). Therefore, cyberspace is the logical extension of the 
structures set in place long ago.  
The Internet development was accompanied by early users’ ideological visions of what 
changes the Internet might bring to the individuals, mostly in terms of freedom and liberation 
of the individuals from capitalist and power structures, but also in terms of cultural issues 
such as social equality and democracy. These utopian ideas of the potentials of the Internet 
are in contradiction with the actuality of the Web experience, especially if viewed in the light 
of capitalist exploitation of the collective activities of Internet users. The following chapters 
explore the clash of utopia and reality on the Web.  
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3. Implications of the Internet Development 
The early computers were massive and took up a significant amount of space, and as 
such were only used by large military complexes and universities. The development of the 
Internet allowed for computers to be viewed as means of communication, rather than just 
tools for controlling military operations or conducting scientific research. As Streeter states, 
“[b]y the late 1970s, among computing professionals, the idea of using computers for 
communication between people was no longer abstract; it increasingly had an experiential 
grounding” (96). In 1972, the Rolling Stone magazine published an article which celebrated 
the arrival of a computer that could be used by individuals for their individual purposes. 
Streets notes that it “presented computers, not just as liberating, but as fun, and perhaps 
liberating because they were fun” (44).  
The article presented computers as a means of liberation for the individual. It easily 
found loyal followers in the American readership, historically bred into the concept of strong 
individualism and self-sufficiency. Streeter places this concept within the tradition of 
romantic individualism. That is, “[b]y offering a romantic framing of computer use – 
computer use could be articulated as playful, expressive, even rebellious – the activity of 
computer use and design no longer need be instrumentally tied to a specific end; the means 
could be an end in itself” (68). From the moment computers were envisioned as an alternative 
way of communication and connection with other individuals, they were perceived as a new 
form of organizing rebellious ideas, which allowed individuals to insert themselves in an 
alternate universe far away from the monotony of their everyday existence.  
This idea is especially emblematic of what Gibson describes in his novel, 
Neuromancer. Streeter argues that “Neuromancer provided a story line that redefined the act 
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of sitting at a keyboard entering commands from one of white-collar drudgery into an act of 
exploration and adventure” (123). A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age, published in 1994, 
further resonates with this idea of the Internet and cyberspace being a new form of frontier to 
be conquered, in which new exciting adventures are possible: “America, after all, remains a 
land of individual freedom, and this freedom clearly extends to cyberspace. How else to 
explain the uniquely American phenomenon of the hacker, who ignored every social pressure 
and violated every rule to develop  a set of skills through an early and intense exposure to 
low-cost, ubiquitous computing”.  
Furthermore, Internet utopians as well as Internet pragmatics, referred to as such by 
Manjikian, see the liberating and democratizing potential of the Internet (383). To utopians, 
the virtual world of the Internet has a democratizing potential to the extent that it “subvert[s] 
existing power structures,” (387) and “[w]hile the real world is gendered, hierarchical and 
ruled by power, the virtual world is nonhierarchical and liberating due to an absence of tiered 
citizenship” (392).  
 These instances reflect the utopian strand of prospective heights society can ascend to, 
if it had just a little help from the Internet and possibilities it can offer in terms of a better 
functioning and more democratizing society. These ideas reflect only one side of the story of 
the potentials of the Web. The actuality of the Web experience shows that these potentials 
have not yet been realized, since the virtual community does not provide liberation or freedom 
for the individual, as seen in problem of Internet centralization by capitalist forces.  
From the very onset of the World Wide Web era, the guiding principle of its creator, 
Tim Berners-Lee, has been that “[t]he system had to have one fundamental property: It had to 
be completely decentralized” (Weaving the Web 16). Decentralization, according to Benkler, 
“describes conditions under which the actions of many agents cohere and are effective despite 
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the fact that they do not rely on reducing the number of people whose will counts to direct 
effective action” (62). Centralization, on the other hand, refers to the process of making 
the behavior of many individual agents cohere into an effective pattern or achieve an 
effective result. Its primary attribute is the separation of the locus of opportunities for 
action from the authority to choose the action that the agent will undertake. 
Government authorities, firm managers, teachers in a classroom, all occupy a context 
in which potentially many individual wills could lead to action, and reduce the number 
of people whose will is permitted to affect the actual behavior patterns that the agents 
will adopt. (Benkler 62)  
Following this line of thought, in its original design, the Web was supposed to provide an 
environment in which an individual is allowed to act according to their will, as opposed to a 
centralized system in which individual agents act according to the accepted behavioral 
patterns issued by the central authority. The centralization of the Web is closely linked to the 
capitalist market relations online. This threatens the decentralized nature of the Web, since 
Web users are somehow linked and traced by a certain social platform – most prominent 
example being Facebook.  
The platform traces Internet users’ browsing behavior – of both Facebook users and 
non-users alike. Gerlitz and Helomond point out that “[e]ven though Facebook cannot connect 
this data to individual profiles and directly use it for personally targeted advertising, it 
enriches the database and contributes to the process of pattern calculation. Therewith, 
potentially every web user becomes a Facebook user as their web behavior can now be traced 
across spaces” (20). Not only does every Web browsing individual become a Facebook user, 
the whole of the Web, as it seems, becomes linked to the platform.  
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The Internet users constitute the very essence of the Web; if that essence is somehow linked 
to one platform, then this can be seen as an instance of centralization of the Web at its most 
obvious. This demonstrates the conflict of the reality of the Web experience with early 
idealistic visions of the Web experience, in which an individual can seek refuge from 
everyday drudgery and market forces larger than them, and be liberated from the constraints 
of late capitalism.  
 Moreover, different constraints are placed on the users’ freedom when considering the 
technical aspects of developing and making the online content available to the users. Berners-
Lee claims that IT layers3 that must remain separate in order for the Web to keep being 
upgraded: “The trouble begins when a program that an individual depends on for his use of 
the Web, such as an operating system or browser, displays an array of icons that will 
automatically connect him to preferred search engines, Web sites, online programs, or ISPs” 
(Weaving the Web 131). The kind of trouble Berners-Lee speaks of can be seen, for example, 
in standard PCs. Today, when we buy a PC, it most often comes with an operating system 
already installed on it. This should not happen. According to Berners-Lee:  
[k]eeping the medium and the content separate is a good rule in most media. When I 
turn on the television, I don’t expect it to deliberately jump to a particular channel, or 
to give a better picture when I choose a channel that has the 'right' commercials. I 
expect my television to be an impartial box. I also expect the same neutrality of 
software. (Weaving the Web 130) 
                                                     
3
 The four horizontal layers of the Web’s infrastructure that Berners-Lee speaks of include, from bottom to top, 
“the transmission medium, the computer hardware, the software, and the content. The transmission medium 
connects the hardware on a person’s desk, software runs Web access and Web sites, while the Web itself is only 
the information content that exists thanks to the other three layers. The independence of these layers is important. 
From the software engineering point of view, this is the basic principle of modularity. From the point of view of 
economics, it is the separation of horizontal competitive markets from anticompetitive vertical integration. From 
the information point of view, think of editorial independence, the neutrality of the medium” (Weaving the Web 
130).  
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The blending of layers, as in the case of buying PCs with Microsoft’s operating system 
already installed on them takes “the user into a controlled view of the world” (Weaving the 
Web 131). Berners-Lee speaks of four different layers of the Web’s infrastructure. They 
include hardware, software, transmission medium, and content. If they are not separated, it 
puts restraints on our access to the Web and, consequently, the rest of the connected world:  
If a company claims to give access to the world of information, then presents a filtered 
view, the web loses its credibility. That is why hardware, software, and transmission 
companies must remain unbiased toward content. I would like to keep the conduit 
separate from the content. I would like there always to be a choice of the unbiased 
way, combined carefully with the freedom to make commercial partnerships. 
(Weaving the Web 132) 
Other issues concerning the various problems the Internet can pose to its users is the 
problem of access. As elaborated by Berners-Lee,  
[t]he fundamental principle behind the web was that once someone somewhere made 
available a document, database, graphic, sound, video, or screen at some stage in an 
interactive dialogue, it should be accessible (…) by anyone, with any type of 
computer, in any country. And it should be possible to make a reference – a link – to 
that thing, so that others could find it. (Weaving the Web 37) 
Even though both the Internet and the Web had started out on the same footing, “meant for 
universities, researches and larger organizations,” (Weaving the Web 80) the Web soon 
became commercialized as well as personalized, and is today used by individuals across the 
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globe. However, across the globe would not be an accurate description since only 39%4 of the 
world population has Internet access.  
 In addition, not all the information put online is accessible to everyone. According to 
Berners-Lee, the links to information “turn the Web’s content into something of greater value; 
an interconnected information space” (“Long Live the Web” 82). The trouble arises when 
there is information that a person cannot link and therefore, have access to. For example, such 
information is located in Apple’s iTunes program. No links can be made to iTunes, which 
places it outside the Web. Berners-Lee refers to such sites as “walled gardens” which, ”no 
matter how pleasing, can never compete in diversity, richness and innovation with the mad, 
throbbing Web market outside their gates” (“Long Live the Web” 83). Even if the problem of 
discrimination on the grounds of accessibility of content is transcended, a slightly different 
issue of discrimination arises – that of social equality.  
The idea of equality online in terms of gender, race, class, ethnicity etc. is best 
summed by Berners-Lee in the following manner: 
While there is great excitement because these new social systems are essentially 
independent of geography, race and religion, they will of course isolate those in 
developing countries who cannot afford or have no option to access the Internet. At 
once the great equalizer and the great divider, the Web highlights – as do clean water 
and health care – the necessity of those better off to care for but not simply control 
those less advantaged. (Weaving the Web 174-175) 
Issues of access and a lack of equality online show, again, the clash of utopian ideas 
and attempts at their execution in reality. Warnick conducted a thorough analysis of the types 
of texts and articles published in a rather influential online magazine, Wired, and came to a 
                                                     
4In 2014, according to Internet World Stats: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm 
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conclusion that the Internet population it appeals to is “overwhelmingly White, male, affluent, 
and technosavvy” (21), and that, as such, its “potential for functioning as a public forum for 
discussion of major technology issues may be impeded by content that favors certain social 
groups and excludes other groups who might be interested in technological issues and policy” 
(22). This is an example of how the Internet can be discriminative towards its users in terms 
of what it has to offer to them. That is, websites tailor their content to cater to the fields of 
interests of only certain select groups, resulting in only those groups and those interests to 
flock to those same sites while at the same time discouraging other groups in participating and 
commenting on the sites.   
 On the other hand, the virtual culture is an extension of the physical one. What follows 
is that racial, gender, ethical and age discrimination are present online. Kollock and Smith 
assert that “[a]n early promise of online interaction was that it would render irrelevant such 
markers as race, gender, status, and age. Because online interaction strips away physical 
markers, the assumption was that the social categories assumed to rest on physical 
characteristics would wither away” (10). The fact that the traditional social and cultural 
hierarchies do not wither away can be exemplified by various online discussion forums. 
Kollock and Smith argue that “[t]he content of the post contains its own set of signals about 
the identity of the author. The writing style, the facts that are brought forth, the proper use of 
abbreviations and argot that are specific to the group, all help establish or challenge the user’s 
identity” (9). More specifically, authors stipulate that racial identity can be inferred from the 
cues a person dispenses when discussing racial issues online, rather than their physical 
appearance (10). 
 It is clear from these illustrations that the virtual experience has not done away with 
the same political and social issues that troubled the non-virtual society before the age of 
Internet, since, ultimately, the non-virtual, real-life community is the essential condition for 
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building a virtual one. It is no revelation then that the mindsets and worldviews individuals 
possessed in non-virtual communities eventually found their way online. This is further 
elucidated by Jenkins who says that people “are choosing to live in red states and blue states, 
just as they are choosing to participate in red and blue communities as they move online” 
(249).  
Finally, in the same way the content online can be socially discriminative, the access 
to the Internet is discriminative towards people in under-developed and developing countries, 
as already mentioned, with just over one third of the world population having it. These 
realities of the Web experience show various utopian ideas as turning into something different 
from what they originally represented.  
Moreover, the concept of individual freedom is not entirely sustainable in an 
environment in which actions of the individual are exploited by capitalist entities. An 
individual, therefore, cannot disappear into the realm of virtual communities if they 
eventually get colonized by late capitalist forces seeking to make profit from the said 
individual.  
Virtual communities have become indispensable elements of late capitalist profit 
making, much in the same way capitalism has helped and has become a crucial element in 
virtual communities building. As stressed by Berners-Lee on numerous occasions, capitalist 
money was necessary for building the Web. Online companies such as Facebook created the 
site; however, it is being kept alive by its community of millions of users. As Terranova 
claims, the Internet is “a mutation that is totally immanent to late capitalism, not so much a 
break as an intensification, and therefore a mutation, of a widespread cultural and economic 
logic” (54). The most prominent example of how the Internet is “immanent to late capitalism” 
can be seen in the Internet users’ activity best described as collaboration. 
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4. Collaborating Online 
Along with the personalized use of the Web, other forms of activity among its users – 
such as collaboration and collective work – were bound to arise as the next logical step. Kelty 
and others define collaboration as a consequence of coordination that takes place in a “media-
specific” place, such as the Web. Coordination allows “a group of people to work together on 
similar topics, in the same places (…) Collaboration is the conceptual and theoretical work 
that results” (187).  
Collaboration on the Internet does not end in its theoretical forms; it can be observed in, 
as stated by Hesmondhalgh, “[p]henomena such as Wikipedia and open source software 
[which] are, without doubt, fascinating examples of cultural activity that attempt to base 
themselves on the pleasures and rewards of co-operation rather than competition” (268). 
These examples could be said to represent Berners-Lee’s vision when creating the Web: “the 
driving force I had in mind was communication through shared knowledge, and the driving 
'market' for it was collaboration among people at work and at home” (Weaving the Web 162).  
Over time, the competition on the Web started to take precedence over collaboration; 
i.e. cultural activities that created sites such as Wikipedia are today being perceived as 
cultural “labor.” The value of Web users’ cultural labor is defined in terms of its affective 
reward, which is defined by Terranova as ”exchange for the pleasures of communication and 
exchange” (48). Ideas and the practice of both cultural labor and affective reward can thrive in 
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economic conditions provided by the late capitalist economy. Terranova calls this late 
capitalist economy the digital economy, which 
is an important area of experimentation with value and free cultural/affective labor. It 
is about specific forms of production (Web design, multimedia production, digital 
services, and so on), but also about forms of labor we do not immediately recognize as 
such: chat, real-life stories, mailing lists, amateur newsletters, and so on. (38) 
Therefore, the Web, which, in the words of Berners-Lee, had started off “as a 
publication medium but less of a collaboration medium” (Weaving the Web 57), soon became 
a collaboration medium in which applications such as open-source software could be 
developed through participation and contributions by millions of Web users. From then 
onward, the Web has become a production medium in which the same collaborative forces 
and exchanges are being appropriated by online companies seeking to extract profit from 
them. Terranova explains that “[i]n this sense, it is technically impossible to separate neatly 
the digital economy of the Net from the larger network economy of late capitalism” (51).  
Collaboration online would not have been possible had it not been for the whole 
collective of the Web working together and, among other things, creating software or sites 
such as Project Gutenberg – an example of peer production5. Collaboration, according to 
Lévy, is “[t]he synergy of skills, resources, and projects, the constitution and dynamic 
maintenance of shared memories, the activation of flexible and nonhierarchical modes of 
cooperation, the coordinated distribution of decision centers” (10). Lévy claims that “[i]f the 
growth of the automobile, which characterizes the twentieth century, corresponds primarily to 
                                                     
5
 More specifically, Benkler refers to “commons-based peer production.” “Commons” is the key word here – it 
refers to giving rights to access and use of resources within the production process, i.e. as opposed to property, 
within commons “no single person has exclusive control over the use and disposition of any particular resource” 
(61). Peer production is a new form of production, characterized by being “radically decentralized, collaborative 
and nonproprietary; based on sharing resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely connected 
individuals who cooperate with each other without relying on either market signals or managerial commands” 
(Benkler 60). Project Gutenberg is an example of peer production: the project is viable because of the volunteers 
who scan books so that they can be accessible in digital form.  
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a desire for individual power, the growth of cyberspace corresponds to a desire for reciprocal 
communication and collective intelligence” (104). This is exactly what Berners-Lee had in 
mind while working at CERN: 
It was clear to me that there was a need for something like Enquire6 at CERN. In 
addition to keeping track of relationships between all the people, experiments and 
machines, I wanted to access different kinds of information (…) Furthermore, I found 
myself answering the same questions asked frequently of me by different people. It 
would be so much easier if everyone could just read my database. (Weaving the Web 
15) 
In the meantime, just like the rest of the Web experience, the collectivity and 
collective intelligence have begun to be exploited by capitalist interests. Jenkins even goes as 
far as referring to collective intelligence as consumption: “None of us know everything; each 
of us knows something; and we can put the pieces together if we pool our resources and 
combine our skills. Collective intelligence can be seen as an alternative source of media 
power” (4).  
 In sum, what started as “individuality,” i.e. one person creating weblike programs to 
help himself make sense of information and people around him, first blossomed into a 
collective, haphazard, non-regulated organization of individuals sharing common ideas, and 
has since then been turned into a pool of resources from which capital interests pluck out what 
generates most profit for them. Repeatedly, the Web is proving to be yet another channel of 
late capitalist forces’ pursuit of revenue. How that revenue is collected is the question of the 
type of labor producing it in the new economic system; i.e., it is the immaterial labor that 
allows capitalism, in its neoliberal form, to flow to the virtual world. 
                                                     
6
 Enquire was Berners-Lee’s first “weblike program.” He wrote it “to help [him] remember the connections 
among the various people, computers, and projects at [CERN]” (Weaving the Web 4). 
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4.1. Immaterial Labor 
Hardt and Negri claim that, approaching the end of the twentieth century, “industrial 
labor lost its hegemony and in its stead emerged 'immaterial labor,' that is, labor that creates 
immaterial products, such as knowledge, information, communication, a relationship, or an 
emotional response” (108). Lazzarato defines two aspects of it, the first being “the labor that 
produces the informational and cultural  content of the commodity,” and the other pertaining 
to “the kinds of activities  involved in defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, 
fashions, tastes, consumer norms” (133).  
Different critics, such as Hardt and Negri lump these two aspects into one, defining 
immaterial labor as the kind of labor that “produces ideas, symbols, codes, texts, linguistic 
figures, images and other such products,” whilst recognizing its other aspect, which they 
name “affective labor,” as the one “that produces or manipulates affect such as a feeling of 
ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion” (108).  
In order to differentiate one form of immaterial labor from another, it is important to 
note the distinction between different products of that labor, i.e. between user-generated data 
and user-generated content. Andrejevic argues that in the process of registration on sites such 
as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Yahoo! etc., “user-generated data is exchanged for access” 
(418). Lilburn elaborates it by saying that since access, i.e. registration “is combined with the 
process of creating an initial profile, users may provide a great deal of personal information 
about themselves before recognizing the significance of their actions” (141). While user-
generated content refers to videos uploaded on YouTube or photos posted on Facebook or 
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Instagram, user-generated data consists of posting links, tags, and clicking on social buttons 
such as Like, Share or Pin.  
It is evident that Hardt and Negri’s description of the first aspect of immaterial labor 
corresponds to the former, i.e. user-generated content, whereas their “affective labor” 
corresponds to the latter. This is noted by various critics such as Arvidsson and Colleoni who 
state that “people who 'create value' for Facebook and other social platforms do so voluntarily 
without any kind of compulsion whatsoever. Indeed, people feel more than compensated (…) 
by the use value and gratification they derive from these activities” (137).  
Here, it is obvious how in creating both user-generated content and user-generated data, social 
networks’ users participate in the capitalist exchange of value; that is, most simply put, the 
company makes use of the uploaded content by selling space to advertisers based on users’ 
content; and users make use of other users’ content by being able to Like or Share – in other 
words, create data. 
The cultural element of virtual communities is being extracted for its value by online 
companies creating those same virtual communities. It is significant to note that the cultural 
would not exist without the effort put into those websites by the people using them; i.e., the 
very fabric of a given “virtual” company – which provides space for the interaction and 
creation of a community – would not be able to survive without its members creating the 
cultural, i.e. profit for the company.  As Terranova points out, “[u]sers keep a site alive 
through their labor, the cumulative hours of accessing the site (thus generating advertising), 
writing messages, participating in conversations, and sometimes making the jump to 
collaborators” (49).  
Social platforms epitomize the flow of capital in the late-capitalist post-Fordist new 
economy. In order to be able to perform such a role, its “laborers” must be turned from 
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passive spectators, which is characteristic of older media such as TV and radio, into active 
participants. The immaterial labor is the concept where such a transformation is made 
possible. Lazzarato clarifies this by stating the following:  
Immaterial labor finds itself at the crossroads (or rather, it is the interface) of a new 
relationship between production and consumption. (…) It gives form to and 
materializes needs, the imaginary, consumer tastes, and so forth, and these products in 
turn become powerful producers of needs, images and tastes. (138) 
The uploaded users’ content is, therefore, both produced by the platform’s users and 
consumed by them. The users become the sole generators of profit for the company, and they 
themselves are seen as commodity, as noted by Fuchs: 
The users who google data, upload or watch videos on YouTube, (…) or accumulate 
friends with whom they exchange content or communicate online via social 
networking platforms like MySpace or Facebook constitute an audience commodity 
that is sold to advertisers. (191-192) 
Moreover, without its commodity, i.e. its users, various social platforms would not be 
able to make profit and therefore even exist. If there are no members clicking on videos and 
links posted by other users, or those videos, photos and links being uploaded in the first place, 
social networking sites would lose their purpose. It is the users and their reception, i.e. 
consumption of the products that constitutes the fabric of the new capitalist system that is 
most visible in online virtual communities.  
The production and consumption of the same product at the same time become 
inseparable one from another. Thus, it can be said that the prosumer, in the late capitalist flow 
of capital, is precisely that – caught in the never-ending flow between action and reaction, 
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production and consumption. Spaces where the labor of the prosumer is most visible are 
precisely the social networking sites, and virtual communities that populate them. 
5. Virtual Communities 
The idea of a prosumer is closely linked to the creation of virtual communities, one 
manifestation of them being social networking sites. In order to define virtual community, it 
needs to be determined what constitutes virtual and what constitutes community. Virtual, 
according to Sökefeld, “points to the irrelevancy of space. Virtual space is a realm in which 
physical space, both proximity and distance, is of no importance” (111). Community, on the 
other hand, is a much more complicated term. For example, Sökefeld reworks Anderson’s 
argument that all communities are imaginary. Put differently, “many communities 'in real life' 
are constituted less by interaction than by imagination. We perceive and represent ourselves 
as belonging to many more communities than simply those based on interaction and face-to-
face relationships” (Sökefeld 107). However, I would argue that interaction is the bedrock of 
virtual communities, with interaction understood here as the exchange of ideas, knowledge 
and interests among Internet users.  
Moreover, Sökefeld continues, the institutions of a given community is what makes it 
not only a collection of individuals, but a collective narrative which recognizes its traditions 
as its base in which individual narratives and experiences can circulate and thus create a 
community (107). In order for a virtual community to be created, two elements are necessary 
– feeling/emotion and discussion/communication: 
Individuals can share emotions (or perceive themselves and others as sharing 
emotions) and participate in communication without necessarily being engaged in 
face-to-face relationships. Accordingly, a sense of belonging and the communication 
of ideas of what a given community is about become crucial. (Sökefeld 106-107) 
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These definitions cast a somewhat idyllic light on virtual communities as places where, 
among other things, certain political ideologies can take their roots, as in the words of 
Dadurka and Pigg who note that the social media might have “the potential to transform 
community and civic participation by redirecting the way individuals spend their leisure time” 
(12). However commendable this may sound, the more likely direction the social media – and 
consequently, virtual communities – will take is in that of capitalist ideologies and capitalist 
exploitation. Arvidsson argues that “the economic value is increasingly connected to the 
quality of social connections” (qtd. in Gerlitz and Helmond 20).  
 With these considerations in mind, what follows are the logical questions of how the 
system actually works and whether its most important elements, i.e. human factors are aware 
of it; and, ultimately, if so, why they agree to participate in it. The answer to all these 
questions is yes, the system does work because the Internet users are not necessarily being 
robbed of their pay for their content and data creation; rather, they are receiving their pay in 
the form of affective reward, or affective gain.  
 
5.1.  Affective Reward 
One of the crucial elements of neoliberalism, according to Foucault, is the 
generalization of the economic form. As he states, “it involves extending the economic model 
of supply and demand and of investment-cost-profit so as to make it a model of social 
relations and of existence itself, a form of relationship of the individual to himself, time, those 
around him, the group, and the family” (242). In other words, the generalization of the 
economic model refers to it becoming a universal, all-encompassing model of not only 
making money on the market, but making all aspects of an individual’s life susceptible to 
analysis in market terms. Moreover, the commercialization of the Web originated in the US, 
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just like the initial invention of the Internet did. Some authors, such as Foucault, argue that 
this may be due to the fact that neoliberal doctrine took the firmest roots precisely in the US,  
when compared to Europe:  
American neo-liberalism evidently appears much more radical or much more complete 
and exhaustive. (…) It involves generalizing it throughout the social body and 
including the whole of the social system not usually connected through or sanctioned 
by monetary exchanges. (Foucault 243) 
Online communities are a sample of a larger social and cultural system not originally intended 
to be involved in monetary exchanges. However, they facilitate this process of exchange for 
both capitalist forces and individuals themselves, which is seen in the practice of companies 
making profit by selling advertising space based on individuals’ activities on the companies’ 
websites, and in the practice of individuals selling their online labor for affective reward.  
Affective reward manifests itself in the form of users’ elation brought about by the 
simple fact of being a part of an online community and sharing their ideas with like-minded 
individuals. It is evident here how, when personal and private elements of human existence – 
such as elation, fulfillment and gratification that come along with a sense of accomplishment 
– get displayed in virtual space, they become appropriated by the market as monetizable 
goods. They no longer stand outside of market relations – they have become a commodity to 
be sold. Petersen argues that in this period of late capitalism and its overreliance on 
information technologies, “commodities have just changed from material/immaterial artifacts 
to people and their data. Commodification of users and their content have proved itself as the 
answer to the problems that capitalism supposedly faced when online communication sparked 
off” (“Loser Generated Content”). 
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However, this explanation of commodification of users’ activities and affective reward 
rather simplifies the system of exploitation. Benkler acknowledges the difference between 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation we are all guided by. The former is imposed on us from the 
outside, it is socially and culturally conditioned and, thus, beyond our control. The latter 
comes from within us and includes, among other things, personal satisfaction (94).  
Due to the social conditioning of the Western civilization, what most often happens is 
that the extrinsic motivation suffocates the intrinsic one. In Western civilization, one is more 
motivated to work for money, i.e. to follow one’s extrinsic motivation, as it will secure one’s 
sustenance, as opposed to following intrinsic motivation which does not necessarily always 
provide the same monetary security for the individual.  Benkler claims that “[i]ntuitively, this 
model relies on there being a culturally contingent notion of what one 'ought' to do if one is a 
well-adjusted human being and a member of a decent society” (94). From there, it becomes 
very easy to conclude that what virtual communities entail is necessarily an extrinsic 
motivation. That is not the case; what is more, Benkler argues, “[a]cross many different 
settings, researchers have found substantial evidence that, under some circumstances, adding 
money for an activity previously undertaken without price compensation reduces, rather than 
increases, the level of activity” (94).  
Following this line of thought, it can be concluded that, while prosumers may be 
exploited and their activities used for profit making, they may be aware of it, but simply do 
not want to acknowledge it as such. Users ascribe comparatively more relevance to their 
activities if they view them only in the light of fulfillment of their intrinsic motivations and 
desires to be a part of a community. If this is the case, then entities such as owners of large 
social networking sites looking to make profit online have more motivation to hide their 
agendas from their communities. If they do so, the members feel more motivated to keep on 
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contributing their time and effort to a certain community, thus generating more profit to the 
owners. 
 However, not every activity we engage in online is necessarily viewed in terms of 
generating profit. There are aspects of online collaboration that entail working with others 
only for the purpose of making parts of the Web experience better functioning and more 
enjoyable for the rest of the Web community. It is referred to as the open source7, or open 
software culture, and as such, it stands out as a part of the Web experience outside of the 
system of companies’ collecting revenue online. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7
 According to Benkler, “[f]ree software, or open source, is an approach to software development that is based on 
shared effort on a nonproprietary model“ (63). The story began in 1984 with Richard Stallamn, working at MIT. 
“He wanted a world in which software enabled people to use information freely, where no one would have to ask 
permission to change the software they use to fit their needs or to share it with a friend” (Benkler 64).  
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6. Open Source Movement 
The open source culture, and many similar parts of the Web community, would not 
have been possible had it not been for the very significant aspect of the Web experience – that 
of its interactivity. When dealing with the virtual world or, according to authors such as Lévy 
– cyberspace, the concept of interactivity is of outmost importance. The interactivity allows 
cyberspace to be “the living, heterogeneous, untotalizable virtual world in which every human 
being can share,” i.e. participate (Lévy 107). In other words, the virtual world is a place of 
contact where individuals across the globe can communicate and interact with one another. 
This is further elaborated by Lévy: “The persons who populate and enrich cyberspace are its 
principal source of wealth. Access to information is probably less important than the ability to 
communicate with experts, agents, the direct witnesses of subjects that interest us” (225).  
Interactivity is what we understand under the term “collaboration,” i.e. sharing and 
creating ideas through human interaction and communication. What constitutes interactivity is 
Berners-Lee’s idea of being able “to create any kind of document, easily. We should be able 
not only to follow links, but to create them – between all sorts of media” (Weaving the Web 
169).  
Berners-Lee’s ideas of intercreativity are seeing the light of day in examples such as 
open-source software where individuals with enough knowledge, expertise and will 
collaborate in order to create a better functioning software than the one offered to the Web 
initially. What is considered the beginning of the open source movement are the workings of a 
Finnish software engineer, Linus Torvalds, who created the kernel – the central component of 
the operating system. Torvalds decided to share the first implementations of the kernel – 
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called Linux, with others online, who then contributed to modifying it. The kernel was 
released under the GPL, or the General Public License.8 By doing this, in the words of 
Benkler, 
Torvalds crystallized a model of production that was fundamentally different from 
those that preceded it. His model was based on voluntary contributions and ubiquitous, 
recursive sharing; on small incremental improvements to a project by widely dispersed 
people, some of whom contributed a lot, others a little. Based on our usual 
assumptions about volunteer projects and decentralized production processes that have 
no managers, this was a model that could not succeed. But it did. (65-66) 
The system and the method took on and, as Benkler elaborates, is today used for creating “the 
basic tools of Internet connectivity – Web server, e-mail server, scripting” (66).  
That said, it is important to note that the Web was created by a physicist at CERN, i.e. 
by an expert, and was initially used only by other experts at various universities, and the 
military. The plan for the Web was for it to be further developed by experts and laymen alike. 
However, the vision has not been completed since, as in the example of open-source software, 
written by IT experts and software engineers, the average netizen9 does not yet write code for 
the betterment of their personal experience on the Web. However, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that the open source movement represents, as the following chapter specifies it, 
the blending of different elements of both culture and economy, which is of the outmost 
importance for the ultimate survival of the economic model the Web operates in.  
                                                     
8
 GPL is, according to Benkler, a type of licensing that “requires anyone who modifies the software and 
distributes the modified version to license it under the same free terms as the original software (…) [It] 
prevent[s] anyone from exclusively appropriating the contributions or the joint product” (64). 
9
 Licklider acknowledges netizens as “citizens of the Internet who assimilate community norms and behaviors 
and work to preserve its collective goods” (qtd. in Manjikian 392). Majnikian continues by saying that, while 
netizens preserve the rules of a given community, and thus refers to them as “good citizens,” the Internet is also 
populated by “bad citizens,” or trolls who, “in contrast to good cyberspace citizens, do not accept community 
norms and cannot be counted upon to play by the rules,” and ultimately, they may even “destroy users’ trust in 
the safety of an Internet community” (394).  
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6.1.  Open Source Movement as the Guardian of Freedom 
If the advent of personal computing celebrated the individual and placed more power 
in their hands – thus perpetuating the American myth of strong individualism and the self-
sufficiency of the entrepreneur – the emergence of open software and open source activities 
were seen as the exact opposite of the idea of an isolated individual as a prerequisite for the 
attainment of the American dream. The neoliberal doctrine placed all its faith in the market 
and its self-regulating mechanisms. The establishment of open source culture countered this 
neoliberal philosophy. As Streeter explains it, the community of computer networkers was 
inventing the very nonmarket tradition of open software production via 'rough 
consensus and working code,' a tradition that would lead to the surprising rise of the 
internet in the early 1990s and later in the decade become the core of one of the major 
countervailing forces against neoliberalism’s simplistic market vision. (72) 
Some authors, such as Streeter, argue that in the late 1990s, a certain shift in market 
philosophy took place. The ultimate bastion of individual freedom – the market – could no 
longer guarantee that it would protect that freedom. Therefore, the individuals turned toward 
cooperation. Streeter dubs the period of late 1990s the period of “the emergence of the 
problem of property on the internet”: 
This was the period when Linux, the open source movement, and music downloading 
raised both excitement and consternation in many legal and management circles. By 
pitting free communication against property rights, these developments called into 
question the premises of the market fundamentalism that had been driving most 
political economic thinking associated with the internet to that point. All of a sudden, 
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freedom and the market were no longer synonymous and, in fact, seemed like they 
might, in some cases, be opposed. (139)  
Not only were the market and freedom opposed, they were in violation of one another. 
The market had tried to limit individual freedom with copyright laws; and the open software 
and free file sharing culture had tried to counter it by sharing and creating non-profit products 
which were under no regulation, and actually, flew in the face of copyright laws. As Benkler 
puts it, we usually think of these activities “as a 'problem.' This is because they were initially 
overwhelmingly used to perform an act that, by the analysis of almost any legal scholar, was 
copyright infringement. To a significant extent, they are still used in this form” (84). 
Moreover, Richard Stallman, a computer programmer responsible for making the first 
steps into creating an open source community used, as Benkler asserts it, “the legal jujitsu 
(…) – asserting his own copyright claims, but only to force all downstream users who wanted 
to rely on his contributions to make their own contributions available to everyone else – came 
to be known as 'copyleft,' an ironic twist on copyright” (65). As shown, the Internet 
community had, in the short period of basically less than one decade, turned from self-
reliance and isolation of its users into a community in its purest form; that is, an assembly of 
individuals tied to each other by mutual interests – those interest not necessarily being 
monetary. This points to another feature of open software culture – that of its most important 
part: the cultural element.  
 As Streeter elaborates this ascertainment,  
more than a few computer engineers know from personal experience that sometimes 
people will do things even if they could make more money from doing something else, 
and (…) a number of those inside the internet engineering community saw computer 
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networking as a case in point. There are times when some of the best work is done, not 
to maximize profit, bout out of passion or commitment to something larger. (154) 
“Something larger” that Streeter speaks of is precisely the Internet community working on 
open software and similar endeavors not for profit, but for their own and others’ enjoyment of 
the Web experience. These instances of Web activities prove the extent to which the Web and 
the Internet rely on their cultural element, i.e. the people using them. Indeed, the cultural 
element itself was the most crucial part that, in reality, brought about the creation of the Web 
and everything that came along with it, including the most important part of the Web – the 
social networking sites.  
 As already described, the Net had initially been used only in military complexes and 
universities. However, in the 1960s, it started entering banks and corporate world. Large 
businesses discovered that computers, and the connection between them, could be used for 
easier data manipulation and, therefore, utilized them in their operations. From there, 
computers got smaller and more powerful and were introduced into individual homes of 
everyday citizens. However, before computers reached the heads of certain corporations, they 
were mostly used by those ranking below. In this way, the extensive use of the Internet 
advanced not top-down, but bottom-up. Streeter claims that 
[g]raduate students and assistant professors were online before university presidents 
and provosts. Middle management, technician, and engineers were online before vice 
presidents and CEOs. (…) This is a relatively unusual pattern of technological 
diffusion; networking entered social life through the same portal as the photocopy 
machine rather than through the top-down diffusion patterns of the telephone. (…) 
This pattern thus meant that the sense of something important happening in 
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networking would hit the middle ranks of the knowledge class before it hit their 
superiors. (124) 
It is clear that, essentially, the Net was viewed as an avenue of freedom from the rules 
imposed “from above.” More importantly, the Web had a romantic ring to it, with the image 
of an individual as the forger of their own destiny, released from the constraints of larger 
culture.  One of the first Web browsers, Netscape, according to Streeter, “gained so much 
attention because it followed a deliberate strategy of creating a media narrative heavily 
centered on a romanticized, heroic construction of the computer counterculture, which proved 
very popular with the media itself” (131).  
This mindset was taken up by younger generations where the earliest generations of 
Internet enthusiast had left it off. As previously elaborated, the first Internet connectivity was 
established among various institutions simultaneously and independently of one another. This 
motto of a decentralized system was picked up later with further Internet and Web 
development. As Streeter points out, “a culture and shared awareness developed in the first 
decades of the internet’s life that took into account the need for, and value of, an open, 
collaborative, nonhierarchical decision-making process” (100).  
Accordingly, the Internet experience can be seen as a medium or a tool that helps 
improve the already established paths of human interaction. It can also be seen as a tool that 
started out as a decentralized element in people’s lives, liberated from the law and order of 
traditional communication channels, which then became controlled and centralized. In the 
same way telephone, telegram and the post office services soon after their introduction to the 
larger society became, at first, controlled by the government, and then centralized and 
privatized. In addition, much like the older communication channels catered to the need of 
individuals at distant places to communicate faster and more efficiently, so did the Internet 
Lenard     38 
 
start out to do the same; i.e. the Internet had the cultural and social contact as the prerequisite 
for its creation. As Berners-Lee points out, 
[t]he Web is more a social creation than a technical one. I designed it for a social 
effect – to help people work together – and not as a technical toy. The ultimate goal of 
the Web is to support and improve our weblike existence in the world. We clump into 
families, associations, and companies. We develop trust across the miles, and distrust 
around the corner. What we believe, endorse, agree with, and depend on is 
representable and, increasingly, represented on the Web. (Weaving the Web 123) 
Plainly, it can be said that what happens on the Web is an extension of our real-life 
experience. This is only logical. People have created the Web and they are the ones who 
populate it, along with their set of beliefs, values and understandings of the world, as 
numerous instances of the Web experience elaborated in this thesis demonstrate.  
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7. Conclusion  
 At first glance, the situation seems rather easy to decipher. There is the real-life 
physical culture we all live in, and then there is the virtual online culture that a significant 
percent of the globe is also part of. This may have been the case several decades ago when the 
Internet was recognized as an alternative means of communication to telephone or telegram; 
however, today, the situation is different and much more complicated. Our physical and 
virtual lives have blended into one, courtesy of the Web development and the emergence of 
cyberspace. Though at first, technologically and in terms of accessibility, the network of 
networks that we refer to as the Internet was only available to a select few – only large 
organizations such as military complexes and universities could access it – both the Internet 
and the Web have spread across the globe and entered private homes. As such, they were seen 
as the perfect fertile ground where economic activities could take their roots.   
 The ramifications of such a condition are numerous, ranging from neoliberal forces 
entering personal lives and private homes, to democratizing society. The instances in which 
these possibilities are most visible are social networking sites which today may be said to 
epitomize the Web community and Web experience at large. The ways in which personal 
lives become commodified are most obvious on sites where individual Web users willingly 
trade bits of their personal lives for participation in online communities. Their activities, 
whichever form they take – be it in the form of liking a video, or making one themselves and 
posting it online – are instances of immaterial labor. In other words, both liking and posting a 
video count as instances from which private companies can make profit. In this thesis, I have 
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tried to explain in detail all the ways in which users’ activities online can be extracted for 
profit, with or without the users’ knowledge of it. 
 However, numerous instances of online activities presented in this thesis show that the 
Web experience is only exploitative to a certain extent and, more importantly, only if we 
place it within the late-capitalist economic paradigm. Online communities provide an avenue 
of change as well. Willingly being a part of an online community and engaging in online 
activities has a certain psychological effect on the individuals inasmuch as it allows them to 
get a sense of being a part of something, not only larger than themselves, but larger than the 
physical world surrounding them.  
Online communities and social networking sites create opportunities for individuals to 
express themselves in ways not possible for them prior to the emergence of the sites. Some 
authors term this opportunity affective reward. It denotes elements of psychological reward 
individuals get when they feel they are a part of a community. This condition is what the 
larger economic systems have very successfully taken advantage of. As elaborated by 
Benkler,  
[f]or all of us, there comes a time on any given day, week, and month, every year and 
in different degrees over our lifetimes, when we choose to act in some way that is 
oriented toward fulfilling our social and psychological needs, not our market-
exchangeable needs. It is that part of our lives and our motivational structure that 
social production taps, and on which it thrives. (98) 
All the acts of human interaction online – taking into account the capitalist perspective – can 
be viewed in the light of immaterial labor and production, be it production of tastes, 
knowledge or videos through interaction, or production of affection and shared joy. Then 
again, even in the most “strict” capitalist societies, such as the US, there are and have always 
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been elements of the Web activity which cannot be incorporated within an economic logic. 
Examples of such parts of economy are voluntary work required in order to keep sites such as 
quora.com and Wikipedia running, as well as the open source culture. As Streeter points out,  
open source itself is hardly a threat to capitalism as a whole. Any thorough look at the 
history of capitalism shows that 'pure' markets have at best been temporary and 
fleeting events; capitalism has generally thrived only in the context of various extra-
market political and institutional underpinnings, with some things treated as property 
amenable to exchange and other things not. All economies, it turns out, are mixed. 
(166) 
This argument might best explain why the migration of capitalism online keeps on proving to 
be a successful endeavor. Just like at any other point in the history of capitalism, the 21st 
century, as the century of information technologies, is providing a terrain where exchanges in 
both monetary and non-monetary terms can be made. 
 Precisely due to the fact that not everything within the economy must abide by its 
strict rules of monetary exchange, the Web and the virtual communities also provide space for 
the attempts to create a better functioning and more liberal democratic society. The 
cyberspace offers a place of liberation for the individual and interaction with the rest of the 
networked globe. Various points of view from which these two significant instances of 
participating online can be seen – from extracting revenue to coloring it the hue of 
psychological affective reward – render cyberspace at first marketplace, and then battlespace 
where various large and small, corporal and individual forces play the game of who will exert 
more influence in the virtual world.  
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